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The Desirability of the Season Long 
Tournament: A Response to Finn
Cesar R. Torres and Peter F. Hager
In an article recently published in the pages of this journal, Stephen Finn (8) 
offers an intriguing defense of the play-off system. Arguing against the criticisms 
that Nicholas Dixon (5) and William J. Morgan (20) direct at said system, Finn 
makes the case that, albeit not an ideal system for organizing athletic competition, 
it is still a good choice because it adds entertainment and drama to sport contests, 
thereby increasing the sport community’s and society’s interest in their outcomes.
Before Finn’s analysis, the two main schemes through which athletic compe-
tition is typically organized (i.e., the play-off and the season long systems) had not 
received sufficient attention in the sport philosophy literature. Admittedly, Dixon 
and Morgan, as well as few others (13: p. 131), have previously referred to some 
strengths and weaknesses of both systems, but Finn’s article is the first entirely 
devoted to the issue. While his locus is the play-off system, by implication he is 
also concerned with the season long system. Finn should be commended for his 
effort to systematize the philosophic study of the way in which athletic competi-
tion is typically organized. In this sense, he has opened up a line of inquiry that 
has implications not only for philosophers of sport but also for sportspeople, 
administrators, and policy makers.
This paper continues and, hopefully, adds a new perspective to the philo-
sophic study of the organization of athletic competition. Since we find Finn’s 
defense of and preference for the play-off system wanting, one of our goals in this 
paper is to respond to his arguments. A larger goal, however, is to demonstrate the 
superiority of the season long system as a method of organizing athletic competi-
tion. The paper is organized in four sections. First, we summarize Finn’s case for 
the preferability of the play-off system. Second, we explain Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
conception of a social practice and discuss it in relation to an interpretivist account 
to competitive sport and its central purpose. This analysis establishes the frame-
work for the third section in which we respond to Finn’s case. In doing so, we 
evaluate the play-off and the season long systems and establish the superiority of 
the latter. The final section provides a summary of our analysis. What this paper 
demonstrates is that the season long system is a more legitimate scheme for orga-
nizing athletic competition and deciding championships, one that respects more 
fully the defining elements of sporting contests.
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Finn’s Case in Favor of the Play-Off System
The defense of the play-off system mounted by Finn originates in Dixon’s and 
Morgan’s disapproval of this method of organizing athletic competition. On the 
one hand, Dixon objects to the play-off system because, by overly emphasizing 
the ability to perform under enormous pressure, it undermines the accurate mea-
surement and determination of athletic superiority, which, for him, contradicts 
competitive sport’s central purpose. On the other hand, both Dixon and Morgan 
disapprove of the alleged reasons behind the implementation of the play-off 
system. They consider that the values driving this implementation are not values 
internal to competitive sport such as athletic excellence or quality of play, but 
rather values that are external to it. Specifically, Dixon and Morgan contend that 
the play-off system is enacted exclusively for financial gain. The argument is that 
by prolonging competition, the play-off system creates postseason opportunities 
for increased profits. Finn calls Dixon’s and Morgan’s view “cynical,” because 
they “imply that the only reason for using a less accurate measure of athletic 
excellence is financial gain” (p. 70). Since Finn believes that there are other legiti-
mate reasons to justify the play-off system, he finds Dixon’s and Morgan’s rail 
against it unfounded.
In order to respond to Dixon and Morgan and build his case for the play-off 
system, Finn appeals to Sigmund Loland’s (15) distinction and relationship 
between the structural and intentional goals of sport. According to Loland, the 
structural goal, which is common to all sports, is “to measure, compare, and rank 
two or more competitors according to athletic performance” (p. 10). It is worth 
noticing the similarity with Dixon’s notion of competitive sport’s central purpose. 
For both Dixon and Loland, the measurement and comparison of athletic excel-
lence are at the core of competitive sport. Intentional goals are, on Loland’s view, 
the multiplicity of personal reasons to partake in competitive sport. These might 
include skill, entertainment, health, political, or financial objectives to mention 
just a few candidates. Loland argues that intentional goals can be internal or exter-
nal to sport. Skill and tactical proficiency are examples of the first while health 
and fame are examples of the second. Furthermore, Loland maintains that inten-
tional goals can override the structural goal of sport (p. 11). This, according to 
Finn, is what Dixon and Morgan fail to notice. Consequently, they either do not 
take into consideration the intentional goals of competitive sport in evaluating the 
play-off system, or if they do consider it, as they seem to in the case of entertain-
ment, they overlook such goals as impediments to the realization of competitive 
sport’s central purpose.
In response, Finn argues that the intentional goal of entertainment as mani-
fested by athletes, spectators, and officials is not only worthy of consideration, but 
also legitimizes the choice of the play-off system. When compared with the season 
long system, Finn goes on, the play-off alternative enhances the level of anticipa-
tion, drama, and excitement not only for those directly involved in the contest, but 
also for the expectant sporting community. Since competitive sport depends upon 
the interest of these people, Finn believes that the play-off system “deserves our 
support because the intentional goals of athletes and fans to partake in a meaning-
ful experience may sometimes outweigh the structural goal of determining the 
proper ranking among athletes” (p. 71). Unlike Dixon and Morgan, Finn is willing 
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to sacrifice the structural goal of sport for intentional goals that are internal to 
competitive sport; more specifically, the goal of enjoyment. He admits, “I would 
rather have a season with a playoff system because it increases the enjoyment of 
sport while still being a good, although not the best, indicator of athletic excel-
lence” (p. 72). Intellectually honest, Finn also admits that his defense “is thus far 
grounded on a subjective attitude concerning the goals of athletic contests” (p. 
72). Pointing to the seemingly large number of sportspeople in the United States 
that favor the play-off system, he claims that his subjective preference for it is 
widely shared.
Besides his subjective proposition, Finn offers one more line of defense for 
the play-off system. Using Randolph Feezell’s (7) elaboration of sport as a prac-
tice pregnant with narrative potentialities that can inspire meaningful and con-
nected living, Finn argues that the play-off system “could well offer a more mean-
ingful and richer experience than a season-long championship” (p. 73). This is so 
because the play-off system breaks with the supposed monotony of the season 
long system’s series of games by culminating with an event that, by raising the 
stakes, stresses drama, tension, excitement, and interest. As Finn clarifies, while 
the season long system offer rich narrative paths for storytelling, “the playoff 
system provides us with, to put it simply, a better story” (p. 73). For him, the play-
off system is to be preferred for its breviloquence, consummation, and exultation. 
These seem to be the qualities that make not only for better storytelling, but for 
better stories—stories that presumably provide the context and content for more 
fulfilling and meaningful living. In his own words, Finn’s preference for the play-
off system is based on his “desire to play in or watch a more exciting game with 
higher stakes” (p. 74).
MacIntyrean Social Practices and Interpretivism
Over the years, many sport philosophers have utilized the writings of virtue theo-
rist Alasdair MacIntyre in their work, especially his discussions on the distinc-
tions between (a) social practices and institutions and (b) the internal and external 
goods associated with them.1 We believe these distinctions are important to this 
current discussion, but intend to present them here in a new way by relating them 
to elements of the interpretivist theory of sport that we hope will further clarify the 
above concepts and their significance for sporting communities.
In his celebrated book After Virtue, MacIntyre defines a social practice as
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appro-
priate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity (18: p. 187)
Since MacIntyre presents cricket (18: p. 191) and American football (18: p. 187) 
as examples of social practices, he at least implicitly seems to accept institutional-
ized sports as instances of social practices as defined above. Examples aside, there 
is good reason to believe MacIntyre would accept sports as social practices, as 
they are activities with exactly the kinds of internal goods he describes. In attempt-
ing to achieve excellence within a sport, individuals and teams must diligently 
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hone and master those skills that make their sport a unique activity. These are 
what Cesar R. Torres (32: p. 86) refers to as the “constitutive skills” of the sport—
the skills that are most central to the comparative purpose of sporting contests and 
“define and shape the character of games” and sports as games. According to 
Torres, the constitutive skills “are the ones gamewrights presumably wanted to 
promote and, in terms of which, performers would test and distinguish them-
selves” (p. 85); “they exist to bring games [and sports qua games] to life, and in 
terms of such skills, players are to show their superiority” (p. 86). In short, the 
constitutive skills are the skills particular sports are primarily designed to test, and 
the ones through which excellence in that sport is to be attained.
Torres’ conception of constitutive skills is an element of the evolving inter-
pretivist view of sport that has developed over the last ten years. Sport philoso-
phers such as Nicholas Dixon (3; 4), J.S. Russell (23; 24), and Robert L. Simon 
(26; 27) have all contributed to the development of this view in an attempt to more 
thoroughly and accurately examine the relationship of sport and morality. Inter-
pretivism is a form of what Simon (27) has called “broad internalism, which, as 
he defines it, “is the view that in addition to the constitutive rules of sport, there 
are other resources connected closely—perhaps conceptually—to sport that are 
neither social conventions nor moral principles imported from the outside” that 
can aid us in determining what is in the best moral interests of sports and sporting 
communities (27 p. 7).
More specifically, Simon states that an interpretivist theory such as the 
Dworkonian theory of sport adjudication developed by Russell in his article Are 
Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With, “derives the principles and theories under-
lying sport . . . from an appeal to the best interpretation of the game or an infer-
ence to the best explanation of its key elements” (27: p. 8). In further clarifying 
this definition, he notes that interpretivists hold that
Certain principles and theories must be presupposed if we are to make sense 
of key elements of sport, such as the rules, the skills that are tested, and pos-
sibly the history, traditions, and central elements of the ethos of particular 
sports. . . . The form of the argument [that an interpretivist might employ] is 
that a particular activity, competitive sport, would lack a point, be not fully 
intelligible, or make no sense (or at least less sense than otherwise) were not 
certain underlying principles taken as normative or as applying to the activity 
in question (27: pp. 8–9)
The notion of constitutive skills is one that can be used by interpretivists to 
explain the central role that certain skills play in defining particular sports and in 
creating athletic excellence within them. In addition, these primary skills can be 
portrayed as foundational internal goods of sports as MacIntyrean social prac-
tices. According to MacIntyre, such internal goods are inherent elements of for-
mally organized social practices. They are “internal” because they can only be 
specified in terms of the particular practice in which they play a role and are only 
available to practice community members (18: pp. 188–189). Internal goods “pro-
vide both activity and enquiry within each practice with their telos” (17: p. 123). 
Thus, on MacIntyre’s view, it is the internal goods of a practice that the members 
of its practice community should oversee, protect, and look to when questions 
arise regarding conduct and change within that practice.
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How is it that a sport’s constitutive skills, as internal goods of excellence of 
that sport, help to establish its purpose? As previously stated, excellence within a 
particular sport is attained through masterful execution of the constitutive skills. 
These skills are the ones that are prescribed and permitted by the constitutive rules 
of the sport—the rules that, in Suitsian terms, set out the lusory means of each 
sport and require contestants to use less efficient rather than more efficient means 
when pursuing the sport’s prelusory goal (29: p. 34–41).
The constitutive rules are, in turn, grounded in the particular “gratuitous 
logic” of that sport—the logic that must apply if we are to have a sport with spe-
cific kinds of challenges. For example, if the sport of football, or soccer as it is 
known in North America, is to exist, there must be a community of practitioners 
willing to adopt the lusory attitude and adhere to the logic of a sport that requires 
them to advance the ball, score, and defend their goals without the use of hands 
(goalkeepers notwithstanding). The constitutive rules of football explicitly detail 
how this logic is to be instantiated in play, and reveal a set of possible, legal 
actions through the prescription of certain less efficient means and proscription of 
other more efficient ones. As Torres states:
constitutive rules prescribe the avenues of access permitted in the pursuing of 
the prelusory goal of a game. This general framework promotes the creation 
of particular and specialized skills that are utilized to better negotiate resolu-
tions of the artificial tests inherent in games (32: p. 85)
The constitutive rules of football thus allow players to defend, to control and 
advance the ball, and to make scoring attempts by using their feet, legs, chest, and 
head. These rules thus facilitate the creation and evolution of the skills of heading, 
chest and thigh trapping, and the varieties of passes and shots utilized in football. 
It is these skills that the members of football’s sporting community recognize as 
the defining skills and internal goods of excellence of their sport. Furthermore, to 
the extent that excellence in football is defined by consistent exemplary execution 
of these constitutive skills in combination, they provide football and its sporting 
community with their telos.
Having identified Torres’ constitutive skills as central internal goods of excel-
lence of sports as MacIntyrean social practices, it is now important to contrast 
these with other goods available through sporting institutions, such as wealth, 
fame, and power. MacIntyre refers to these types of goods as “external good” 
because they are only contingently associated with social practices. Unlike inter-
nal goods which can only be experienced through participation in or strong 
acquaintance with a specific practice, external goods can be secured through other 
practices and activities. However, as Mike McNamee (19: pp. 75–76) points out, 
external goods may not be attained in as satisfying or as meaningful a manner by 
those who value particular practices like sports, because these individuals have a 
love and appreciation for their practices that they do not have for other practices 
from which they might accrue status, power, and riches.
As MacIntyre portrays them, external goods also tend to be scarcer for prac-
tice community members than the more basic internal goods of the practice. In 
After Virtue, he notes that:
External goods are . . . characteristically objects of competition in which there 
must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of 
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competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement 
is good for the whole community who participate in the practice. So when 
Turner transformed the seascape in painting or W. G. Grace advanced the art 
of batting in cricket in quite a new way, their achievement enriched the whole 
relevant community. (pp. 190-191)
In sport, participants and knowledgeable spectators can all enjoy great perfor-
mances and displays of skill mastery, but not everyone can be a professional ath-
lete with a multimillion-dollar contract or a member of an elite championship 
team. These latter external goods are thus scarcer than the internal goods that any 
informed member of a sporting community can enjoy through their understanding 
of and participation in the practice, and, according to MacIntyre, are attained and 
distributed by institutions such as sport leagues and governing bodies. Ideally, it 
is the purpose of such institutions to garner resources and provide support (eco-
nomic and otherwise) to the social practices they represent, and to appropriately 
distribute scarce external goods through well developed systems of rewards.
While, as McNamee (19: pp. 76–78) reminds us, external goods are not nec-
essarily problematic for social practices like sports, the quest for high salaries, 
endorsements, profits, celebrity, and power has become so competitive that many 
owners, administrators, athletes, and coaches are willing to forsake their sporting 
practices in the pursuit of them. MacIntyre warns of just such a possibility in After 
Virtue, noting that:
Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions—and con-
sequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practice in ques-
tion—that institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal 
order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulner-
able to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for 
the common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness 
of the institution. (p. 194)
As problematic as external goods can be, McNamee (19: pp. 73–78) cautions that 
they are not necessarily corrupting influences for sports as social practices or for 
their internal goods. He utilizes the work of John Kekes in critiquing MacIntyre’s 
views on external goods in relation to sport. According to Kekes (12: p.192), exter-
nal goods can provide intrinsic satisfaction to those who receive them, both as 
“public confirmations” of the achievement of excellence within the practice and as 
valued scarce goods that “confer privilege,” when they are earned and distributed 
justly. “What this implies for practices such as sport,” McNamee (19) infers, “is that 
the presence of external goods as rewards for achievement is not inherently bad 
except that their corrupt and distorted systems of distribution make them so” (p. 77).
McNamee believes that sporting communities need to seek an appropriate 
balance between internal and external goods. He contends that external goods do 
have their place in sport as earned rewards and public recognitions of excellence, 
but that, as MacIntyre argues, such goods should neither corrupt nor direct the 
practice that their institutions serve. In closing his thoughts on the proper balance 
between internal and external goods, McNamee notes that:
Because practices offer us the variety of goods sports do and a range of public 
recognitions for our relative excellence in them, in proper part and justly 
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conferred, we have all the more reason to value them. This will not be done 
by denying the place of external goods in those practices and in our lives 
but by ensuring their subordination to our prior commitments to the internal 
goods but by keeping them in their place (19: p. 78)
Now that we have a clear understanding of the elements of MacIntyrean social 
practice theory, we are in a better position to see how it aligns with the interpretiv-
ist view of sport. As previously demonstrated, MacIntyre appears to accept insti-
tutionalized sports as social practices, and thus implicitly recognizes them as the 
type of activities that get their purpose from and are defined by a set of specific 
internal goods through which excellence is to be attained. Similarly, interpretivists 
recognize sports as activities that are uniquely defined by the lusory logics, chal-
lenges, and means through which excellence in them is to be achieved. In addi-
tion, as shown above, Torres’ constitutive skills are clear examples of MacIntyrean 
internal goods of sport; others might include lusory strategies, some restorative 
skills such as throw-ins in football and free throw shooting in basketball, and 
contesting excellences noted by R. Scott Kretchmar and Tim Elcombe (14: p. 
189), including playing with a lead and coming from behind.
Another link between MacIntyrean theory and interpretivism is the belief that 
the internal goods of sport should be supported and carefully looked after. 
MacIntyre himself (18: p. 94) contends that the members of practice communi-
ties, such as those related to sports, should look to the internal goods of their 
practices to determine the virtues they must cultivate and demonstrate if they are 
to attain those internal goods. The actions, the virtues, and internal goods recom-
mend in a given situation would thus come from the best interpretation of the 
specific practice and would presumably be actions taken with the best interests of 
that practice in mind (16: pp. 111–112).
Interpretivists also recommend that sporting communities act with the best 
interests of internal goods such as their constitutive skills and their sport’s foun-
dational gratuitous logic as guides. Principles such as the “Principles of Adjudica-
tion in Sport” developed by Russell (24: pp. 35–37) and the “Principles for a Just 
Evaluation System” presented by Torres and Hager (30: pp. 218–219), stand as 
examples of how interpretivist theories can offer the members of sporting com-
munities general guidance in determining courses of action or recommending 
alterations to their formal structures or institutional frameworks, by utilizing those 
central internal goods that make them the unique activities they are. For instance, 
Russell’s first principle of adjudication (24: p. 35), which states that “Rules should 
be interpreted in such a manner that the excellences embodied in achieving the 
lusory goal of the game are not undermined but are maintained and fostered,” and 
Torres and Hager’s principle stating that “Just evaluation systems should put a 
premium on goal achievement through constitutive skills” (30: p. 219) both clearly 
emphasize the primacy of the constitutive skills of sports as internal goods that are 
to be promoted and protected.
Finally, both the MacIntyrean and interpretivist views emphasize that the 
internal goods and standards of excellence of sports as social practices should not 
be subjugated to external goods or individual preferences. When institutions pro-
pose changes to sporting practices that sacrifice the primacy of internal goods 
such as the constitutive skills in favor of external goods such as financial gains or 
increases in popularity, MacIntyreans and interpretivists alike will argue against 
46    Torres and Hager
such changes because they support neither the best interests of sports as social 
practices nor the best interpretations of them. Having thus established that 
MacIntyrean social practice theory aligns well with the interpretivist view of 
sport, we may now respond to Finn’s arguments for the play-off system.2
A Response to Finn’s Case in Favor of the Play-Off System
As seen above, Finn’s first line of defense for the play-off system is based upon 
the claim that the intentional goal of entertainment that inspires athletes, specta-
tors, and officials legitimizes the choice of the play-off system. Thus, he argues 
that “While an accurate ranking is certainly one of the many goals of sport, it 
should not necessarily take priority over the intentional goals of athletes and fans” 
(p. 74). Not only does Finn believe that the implementation of a competitive 
scheme that maximizes the opportunity to accomplish the structural goal of sport 
is shortsighted, he also contends that the value of entertainment is internal to com-
petitive sport. We believe that Finn’s first line of defense for the play-off system is 
wanting in several respects.
Our initial argument against Finn’s position relates to the status of intentional 
goals, specifically entertainment and enjoyment, and their relation to the struc-
tural goal of sport understood as a MacIntyrean social practice. As a social prac-
tice, each sport possesses a constitutive and defining set of internal goods of 
excellence. Paraphrasing MacIntyre, the internal goods of excellence provide 
each sport with its telos. When we enter into a particular sport, we necessarily 
enter into a kind of human activity in which the internal goods of excellence are 
of paramount importance and, therefore, provide guidance and inspiration to our 
actions and desires. This suggests that intentional goals are contingent to the telos 
of each specific sport. Whatever the specific intentional goals athletes, spectators, 
and officials seek to materialize when engaged in sports, they do so by partaking 
in a particular sport and its internal goods of excellence rather than another. In this 
sense, both internal and external intentional goals are bound to the internal goods 
of excellence of the sport. The latter do not take priority over the former, but are 
primary in a logical sense. So, athletes, spectators, and officials are expected to 
pursue not just crass entertainment, but the entertainment that only the submission 
and devotion to the internal goods of excellence can offer and provide. This kind 
of entertainment has its source in the quest for the internal goods of excellence 
and, thus, possesses a profound meaning rather than the sense of amusement or 
diversion typically associated with it.
McNamee has argued that sporting communities need to subordinate the 
external goods of sport to our primary commitment to the internal goods, other-
wise their predominance distorts social practices by relegating their internal goods 
of excellence to a secondary role. This is clearly the case with external intentional 
goals such as fame, wealth, or prestige—what Finn calls external considerations 
to sport. The same logic, however, also applies to the internal intentional goals of 
athletes, spectators, and officials. They need to be subordinated to the internal 
goods of excellence if the social practice is to thrive.
Finn could say that his position is compatible with this view, since some 
internal intentional goals, such as “participating in an inherently enjoyable activ-
ity” or “striving for athletic excellence,” are aligned with the structural goal of 
sport, all of which he calls internal considerations to sport (p. 72). While some 
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internal intentional goals seem to be aligned with the structural goal of sport and 
its internal goods of excellence, others, such as “improving one’s health” (p. 72), 
may not be so. Indeed, preoccupation with our health could minimize concerns for 
the structural goal of sport and its internal goods of excellence. Moreover, on 
occasion, some attempts to heighten the athletes’ and spectators’ experience of 
suspense, drama, and excitement, all internal intentional goals, have led to deci-
sions that jeopardize or contradict both the structural goal of sport and its internal 
goods of excellence. One example is the implementation of tie breakers to force 
the decisions of winners and losers even in games that do not require such deci-
sions. Many tie breakers not only neglect the efforts of the athletes during regula-
tion play, they also require them to exercise skills that are peripheral to the sport 
as constituted to settle the score and determine a winner and a loser. The addi-
tional suspense, drama, and excitement are derived from a source that is detached 
from the core of the sport. Not surprisingly, tie breakers are common in competi-
tive schemes that involve a play-off.
Our argument does not negate that intentional goals do have a place in com-
petitive sport. It says that they are logically subjugated to the structural goal of 
sport and its internal goods of excellence. The interpretivist approach to sport as 
MacIntyrean social practices discussed in the previous section indicates that when 
we agree to participate in competitive sport, we necessarily agree to measure our 
ability to solve the problem inherent to the sport through the implementation of 
the relevant internal goods of excellence and compare it to that of our opponent. 
The intentional goals are not as logically strong as the necessity to fulfill the struc-
tural goal and the sport’s internal goods of excellence. Thus, in sport, intentional 
goals do not enjoy the privileged and autonomous status Finn assigns them; 
indeed, their proper role is as subsidiary. Privileging them sacrifices what charac-
terizes competitive sport, which elicits the following question: “why choose com-
petitive sport if the intention is to subvert it?” This is precisely what the play-off 
system does. It vitiates the measurement and comparison of athletic excellence to 
promote values such as drama, fun, and entertainment, which, as demonstrated 
previously, are logically dependent on the relevant internal goods of excellence in 
competitive sport. In a sense, competitors who choose intentional goals that are 
prone to facilitate this vitiation fail qua competitors.
It is also questionable whether the play-off system heightens some of the 
values Finn argues it does. The case of the Rugby Union is instructive in this 
regard. Rugby Union is a sport with an increasing global appeal. Teams can earn 
points by scoring either tries or goals. Whereas the first method of scoring carries 
5 points, the second carries 3 points for penalty kicks and dropkicks, and 2 point 
for conversion kicks. Although teams have several ways at their disposal to earn 
points, Rugby Union practitioners agree that “scoring tries is the real joy of rugby” 
(33, p. 15). From an interpretivist point of view, it could be argued that try scoring 
is not only a most distinguishing feature of the sport, but also an element that the 
practice community seeks to emphasize and realize. Unsurprisingly, in its Review 
of the Game 2003, the International Rugby Board highlights that “If the desired 
objective of the game is to win through scoring tries and concede few penalties, 
then both 2003 and 2002 have been exceptional years” (10: p. 6). That was the 
case because during that period “points from tries exceeded points from penalty 
goals by over 50%” (10: p. 6). Similarly, in its analysis of the 2003 Rugby Union 
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World Cup, the International Rugby Board stresses that “81% of the matches were 
won by the team scoring the most tries” and that “proportionately more tries and 
fewer penalties were scored than in all World Cups but the first one” (11: p. 1). 
Evaluating the history of the Rugby Union World Cup after its 2007 edition, the 
International Rugby Board further remarks that of the 233 matches played in the 
tournament to date “only 11 were won by the team that scored the fewest tries 
but kicked more penalties” (9: p. 16).
The deemphasis of goal scoring and emphasis of try scoring by both Rugby 
Union officials and the whole practice community indicates that the game is at its 
best and flourishes when try scoring, along with the strategies conducive to its 
materialization, predominate. That is to say, Rugby Union’s connoisseurs find the 
game deeply entertaining, joyful, meaningful, and attractive when try scoring is 
sought and manifested. Yet, the competitive format implemented in the Rugby 
Union World Cup seems to deviate from this understanding of the game. While 
the initial stage of the tournament involves a round-robin in which all teams from 
each of the pools play each other, the final stage includes the first and second 
teams from each pool in a single-elimination format that decides the champion. 
As Rugby Union World Cups enter into their knockout phase, the relationship 
between try scoring and penalty-goal scoring changes dramatically in detriment 
of the former. For instance, “at the final stages [of the 2003 Rugby Union World 
Cup] however, penalties exceeded tries by 4 to 1” (11: p. 3) and no team scored 
more than one try in either the semifinals or the final. In the final of the 2007 edi-
tion of the tournament, no tries were scored at all (9: p. 1). The International 
Rugby Board seems to lament this situation, clarifying that “Nevertheless, in gen-
eral, it is tries that win matches” (11: p. 11. See also 9: p. 15). All this suggests that 
the play-off system implemented in the final stages of the Rugby Union World 
Cups fosters less entertaining, attractive, and joyful games, as it manifestly takes 
away “the real joy of rugby.”
On the one hand, the case of Rugby Union suggests that the play-off system 
does not necessarily fulfill its promise of more entertaining, attractive, and joyful 
games. Indeed, it is the round-robin phase of the sport’s World Cup that appears to 
better foster the game’s internal goods of excellence. The Rugby Union’s practice 
community seems to find more entertaining, attractive, and joyful, games in which 
the defining core of the game is positively sought out and enacted. These connois-
seurs deeply respect the social practice and favor entertainment, drama, and joy 
that not only are based on its internal goods of excellence, but that also advance the 
structural goal of competitive sport. It could be argued that they favor “constitutive 
or structural entertainment, drama, and joy.” The play-off system, and its alleged 
higher stakes, does not guarantee any of this and could possibly lead to conserva-
tive, speculative, and negative play in which constitutive skills are relegated to 
secondary status. In this sense, it also appears to promote an excessive concern for 
results and a lack of concern for the quality of performance. On the other hand, and 
related to the previous point, the case of Rugby Union also suggests that the play-
off system sacrifices both the accurate measure and materialization of athletic 
excellence. Evidently, the knockout stage of the Rugby Union World Cup does not 
portray the game at its best. At least in this case, as implied by the game’s officials, 
there is a deleterious effect on its internal goods of excellence. The same can be 
said about the accomplishment of the structural goal of competitive sport.
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Given these criticisms, we might question why it is that the play-off system is 
used so frequently. Without appealing to what Finn calls the cynical view (a view 
which he admits may be true in American sports [p. 70]), one possible answer is 
simply logistics. While this may be the case in some instances, such as the Olym-
pic Games and different sports’ international tournaments, it seems that there are 
numerous cases in which logistics hardly make the play-off system a necessity. 
Indeed, that seems to be the case with the most popular sports in the United States. 
Another example is the use of the play-off system in interscholastic, intramurals, 
or recreational sport. In many cases, time and other resources are available to 
utilize competitive formats other than the play-off system. The point which Finn 
does not explore is that sportspeople could have been simply socialized to prefer 
such a system, even though there might be competitive systems such as a season 
long championship, that are more fair, nuanced, and aligned with an interpretivist 
approach to sport as MacIntyrean social practices and that highlight both the inter-
nal goods of excellence and the structural goal of competitive sport. In contrast to 
the situation in American sport, practice communities around the world favor a 
season long tournament to a play-off.3 Given the arguments expounded so far, the 
latter is to be preferred.
Finn portrays the structural goal of sport as one that provides us with a “thin” 
concept of sport, and argues that the intentional goals of athletes and spectators 
need to be accounted for more strongly in the institutional decision-making pro-
cess because sport “offers so much more than raking competitors” (p. 72). There 
are two problems with Finn’s claims. The first is that Finn misrepresents the struc-
tural goal of sport by overemphasizing the ranking aspect of it and underempha-
sizing the importance of accurately measuring and comparing athletic excellence. 
If rank is the only thing that matters, the focus of sport is outcome seeking rather 
than resolution seeking (31). Both outcome seekers and resolution seekers are 
seduced by the test delineated by its rules and internal goods of excellence. While 
the former are mainly attracted to the zero-sum qualities of competition and 
engage in a quest for favorable results regardless of athletic merit and quality of 
play, the latter are deeply concerned about the process of contesting and the role 
that excellence plays in making this process meaningful. This being so, the pri-
mary focus of the structural goal of sport should not be the mere raking of com-
petitors, but the measurement and comparison of athletic excellence. It is clear 
that all wins are not created equal; some victories demonstrate greater levels of 
excellence than others. The play-off does not account for this. By contrast, the 
season long championship, by better accounting for the athletic excellence dis-
played throughout an entire season by the participants, promotes rakings that are 
not just more accurate but, more importantly, are fully meaningful. Undoubtedly, 
ranking competitors is not, from our perspective, the only thing that matters.
Second, contrary to Finn, we believe that dedication to the structural goal of 
determining athletic superiority through the measurement and comparison of ath-
letic excellence provides a richer concept of sport; one that is more meaningful 
because it focuses on each sport’s internal goods of excellence as a unique social 
practice. Institutions should foster the structural goal because it is the one goal in 
which each sport’s meaning is grounded. Athletes and coaches should do the 
same. Whereas spectators are expected to recognize, appreciate, and celebrate 
athletic excellence, athletes are also expected to embody and expand it. This, of 
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course, cannot be accomplished without submitting to the internal goods of excel-
lence of sport and its structural goal. This view of sport is richer because it pro-
vides the ground for the development of dispositions, skills, and accomplishments 
that, when blended together, make for meaningful and coherent living. We see the 
“more” that Finn believes is offered by sport as growing from the social practice 
itself and not from intentional goals. The commitment to and rewarding of athletic 
excellence trump general excitement and entertainment. An exciting or entertain-
ing game is not necessarily an excellent one; although it could be.
Finn’s second line of defense for the play-off system proposes that when 
compared with the season long scheme, its copious offer of narrative potentialities 
can inspire “a more meaningful and richer experience” (p. 73). For him, the play-
off system provides a better story, one that is richer and more meaningful than a 
season long scheme. While we agree that sport is a social practice that tends to be 
experienced as intrinsically valuable and that it exudes narrative potentialities for 
meaningful and connected living, we disagree on several accounts with Finn’s 
evaluation of the play-off system as a richer narrative source.
One of the problems with the play-off system is that it tends to undervalue, 
neglect, or flatly rejects what happens during the primary season. This is how 
athletes, coaches, and spectators seem to experience the play-off: everything starts 
anew. Whatever the qualitative character of the narratives that unfolded before this 
competitive stage, it is of little to no consequence as the play-off constitutes a 
whole new beginning. This detachment or disconnectedness hardly represents or 
is conducive to the kind of unitary experience Finn favors. The lack of unity 
between the play-off and the season that leads up to it is especially discernible 
when the defining internal goods of excellence of sport are taken into consider-
ation. Feezell argues that the possibility for intrinsically valuable experiences 
“may be more available to those whose interest in and knowledge of the sport are 
keen” (7: p. 41). Interest and knowledge of sport necessarily refer to the internal 
goods of excellence and the structural goal of sport. It is problematic to argue and 
accept that the play-off system is superior to the season long format when it seeks 
a consummation that, by its very structure, jeopardizes what would otherwise be 
a most satisfactory completion: the measurement and comparison of athletic 
excellence. Rather than enriching the narrative possibilities offered by sport, the 
play-off system impoverishes them by, at best, diminishing or, at worst, denying 
the significance of the primary season and detracting from athletic excellence, in 
a way that prevents an integrated sport experience. Raising the stakes leads neither 
to a richer narrative structure nor to the sense of completion and satisfaction 
appreciated by connoisseurs of sport. In fact, it increases the chances that neither 
will most likely occur.
In this regard, Finn underestimates the importance of accurately rewarding 
the accomplishments of athletes and teams. Contra his example of the 2007 
National Football League season and the 2008 Super Bowl, American profes-
sional sport narratives generally tell a story in which the season long champion 
who loses in the highly charged play-off is inferior to the winner. At least in the 
United States, few season long champions are remembered by the public, while 
play-off winners are typically exalted and generously rewarded by governing 
bodies and the public. In fact, sport narratives are frequently created around indi-
viduals and teams that win play-off tournaments, while the accomplishments of 
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season long champions are devalued by media outlets and representatives who 
create stories primarily consumed and remembered by the sporting public. These 
narratives, far from appreciating the nuances and complexities of the sport in 
question, seem to exude sensation, entertainment, immediateness, simplicity, and 
conciseness. Finn summarizes this well, explaining that the play-off system 
“heightens one’s interest in the outcome” (p. 74). The play-off system, by virtue 
of its structure, facilitates focusing mainly on outcomes. Given our discussion 
above, it should come as no surprise that we find narratives, both personal and 
public, that center around the quest for, measurement, and comparison of athletic 
excellence richer than those that exalt the zero-sum qualities of competition.
What follows from the previous point is that Finn also underestimates the 
richness that season long narratives can have in relation to play-off narratives, 
and, at the same time, overestimates the excitement play-off narratives bring with-
out demonstrating why these stories are inherently more exciting than those pro-
vided by season long schemes. Again, in the United States, play-off narratives 
themselves seem to have become more or less homogenous. They are common-
place and less nuanced than the season long narratives of, for example, national 
football leagues in Europe and Latin America and, therefore, carry less excitement 
than Finn indicates they do. This has to do with the structure of the play-off 
system, and what it sets out to test and accomplish: to determine an outcome (to 
establish a winner and a loser) in a highly charged situation. Ironically, it could be 
argued that the play-off system only establishes a ranking between two contes-
tants. That is the case because, in the name of entertainment, drama, and excite-
ment which it does not guarantee either as observed in many play-offs in which 
the winner is decided early on, its sacrifices athletic excellence and the many 
meaningful values associated with its pursuit. As Feezell puts it in relation to 
baseball, to love the sport is to immerse ourselves “in a world . . . of admirable 
excellences” (7: p. 45). The season long system opens up possibilities for deeply 
meaningful experiences because they are forged in, around, and through these 
admirable excellences.
Part of Finn’s underestimation of the richness that season long narratives can 
have in relation to play-off narratives seem to reside in what the former competi-
tive system offers and entails. Apparently, Finn believes that the season long tour-
nament is simply an aggregation of discrete games each without much signifi-
cance. He says that “With a season-long championship, many of the games have an 
equal value, the ‘best’ team may emerge long before the season ends” (p. 73). If 
value here takes a formalistic connotation, it is true that all games in a season long 
tournament, and not just many, are of equal value: the evaluation system rewards 
all games equally. However, if value has an experiential dimension that is clearly 
not the case. Teams have an unfolding story throughout the season and each game 
plays a role in the story. Each game serves as a terrain in which teams (re)discover 
their identity and is significant in this regard. That is, each game offers narrative 
possibilities and influences the evolving discursive pattern of all competitors. 
Standings represent this evolving discursive pattern and, thus, display the organic 
connection among the performance of all teams in all games at a given time in the 
season. The (re)configuration of the standings as a season advances precisely 
reflects athletic excellence, the unifying theme of competitive sport. The narratives 
facilitated by a season long tournament engage all participating teams in their 
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intricate interminglings as well as their individual stories, all embedded in a web 
of historical patterns and meanings.4
The season long scheme is a better story than the play-off, but its full apprecia-
tion requires sportspeople to pay close attention to a complex unfolding story that 
involves permutations among all teams involved. Rather than presenting a frag-
mentary story, the season long system makes for an intelligible totality centered on 
athletic excellence. Paraphrasing John Dewey, the season long tournament is no 
uniform uninterrupted series of games, but a competitive structure integrating a 
series of games, each having its own history, plot, and quality pervading it through-
out. By placing a premium on the quest and celebration of the internal goods of 
excellence, the season long scheme provides us with an enriching and powerful 
story to make better sense of life. It goes beyond episodic exaltations of outcomes 
and reaches into our ability to develop a predisposition to understand, appreciate, 
and embrace the complexity, nuances, and potential of the season long scheme’s 
internal organic unity as well as its meaning for coherent living.
End of the Season
This paper is a critical response to Finn’s case for the preferability of the play-off 
system as a method of organizing sport competition and, concomitantly, a defense 
of the season long system. Against “foes say[ing] that the season-long rotisserie 
total/record point style eliminates that ‘any given Sunday’ excitement that can 
come with a single-elimination play system” (28: p. 257–258), we argue that, 
when examined from an interpretivist account of sport as MacIntyrean social 
practices, the former is to be preferred to the latter. This account of competitive 
sport underlines both its internal goods of excellence and structural goal, thus, 
rendering intentional goals contingent to them. Pursuing, measuring, and compar-
ing athletic excellence take precedence over the unqualified desire for a flick of 
Sunday excitement. In this regard, we believe that our defense of the season long 
system is based on a thick account of competitive sport, one that by fostering dedi-
cation to the structural goal of determining athletic superiority through the mea-
surement and comparison of athletic excellence, provides the ground for mean-
ingful and coherent living. The season long system opens up possibilities for 
deeply significant experiences and narratives, both personal and public, because 
they are precisely forged in, around, and through athletic excellence rather than a 
yearning for entertainment. As MacIntyre would say, pursuing excellence is a 
defining element of the good life and, at the same time, a source for unitary and 
manifestly satisfying human narratives.
Notes
1. See for example Arnold (1), Schneider and Butcher (25), Butcher and Schneider (2), and 
Morgan (21; 22).
2. It has not escaped us that we are aligning two moral theories that appear to be in opposite 
camps. MacIntyre’s theory of practical reasoning is generally regarded as an anti-realist moral 
theory, while interpretivist accounts of sport are presented in the sport philosophy literature as 
realist moral accounts. Space does not allow us to weigh in on the realist/anti-realist debate 
here, but we believe that, given MacIntyre’s apparent acceptance of organized sports as social 
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practices and the relationship we have demonstrated between key internal goods of sports (i.e., 
their constitutive skills) and their specific types of gratuitous logic and constitutive challenges, 
it is reasonable to align these views in spite of their meta-ethical differences. Indeed, MacIntyre 
seems to allow sufficient distance between the internal goods of sport and what sporting com-
munities think these goods are. In doing so, he apparently leaves room for external criticism of a 
sporting community’s decisions about its sport and aligns his position with that of interpretivists.
3. English football has three yearly tournaments: the Premier League, which follows a season 
long format, and the Football Association Challenge Cup and the Football League Cup, both of 
which follow a knockout format. However, it is the winner of the Premier League that is widely 
regarded as the most accomplished and preeminent team in English football. Similar situations 
are found in different European football and other sports leagues.
4. In addition to these arguments, the organizational structure of many European and South 
American football leagues (and many other sports around the world) further demonstrate that 
games in a season-long championship do not have equal value. The systems of promotion and 
relegation and qualification for supranational competitions in these leagues provide great incen-
tives for teams to be competitive throughout the entire season, even if they lose all chances to 
win the championship at a given point of the season and/or if the “best” team emerges before the 
end of the season. These incentives clearly provide different value and significance to games. 
In the case of the Argentine football league, relegation is decided based on the average of the 
last three seasons. It is important to note that professional sport leagues in the United States and 
Canada are notable exceptions to the promotion and relegation system. See (6).
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